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Questions Presented 
I. Did the Secretary of the Interior err by authorizing the acquisition of 
land for the Miseño Band based on a determination that the Miseño meet 
the first prong of the definition of “Indian” in Section 19 of the IRA? 
II. Does Section 5 of the IRA constitute an unconstitutional exercise of 
Congressional authority to the Secretary that violates the nondelegation 
doctrine and the Tenth Amendment? 
Statement of the Case 
I. Statement of Facts 
The Miseño people have lived in Southern California since time 
immemorial. R. at 1. They first had contact with the Spanish in the late-
eighteenth century, and a mission was subsequently built. R. at 1. Mexico 
divided the mission lands into private land for its citizens in 1838, so long 
as they did not interfere with the Miseño living there. R. at 1. After the 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, the United States sent Indian Affairs officials 
to California to negotiate treaties with the tribes in the region, but the 
                                                                                                                 
 * This brief has been edited from its original form for ease of reading. The record for 
this brief comes from the 2017 National Native American Law Students Association Moot 
Court Competition facts, which can be found at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/c50703_769cb 
94824164c74b817ae43c4cb6a0b.pdf. 
 ** Devon Suarez is a third-year student at Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at 
Arizona State University. He is from Heber, a small town atop the Mogollon Rim in 
northeastern Arizona. During his last semester of law school, he started a timber company. 
The company is currently working with the federal government and non-profit organizations 
to reduce wildfire risks and restore the pine forests of northern Arizona through stewardship 
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 *** Simon Goldenberg graduated from the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at 
Arizona State University in May 2017, where he received an Indian Law Certificate. 
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Miseño were never participants in negotiations or mentioned in reports. R. 
at 1. By 1880, there was only one Miseño village left. R. at 1. The Miseño 
were removed from that village after a family with title to the land 
successfully brought suit against them in state court. R. at 1. 
Despite their removal, many of the Miseño continued to live in the same 
area, and still do today. R. at 2. The United States recognized the Miseño as 
an Indian tribe in 1982. R. at 2. In 2005, the Miseño asked the Secretary of 
the Interior (“the Secretary”) to obtain land near a former village site and 
place it in trust. R. at 2. In 2010, the Department of the Interior (“the 
Department”) produced a record of decision (“ROD”) confirming that the 
land would be put into trust. R. at 2. The ROD interpreted 25 U.S.C. § 479 
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carcieri v. Salazar. See 
555 U.S. 379 (2009); R. at 2. The Department found that the Miseño were 
“under federal jurisdiction” in 1934. This decision was based on an excerpt 
from the 1851 Act to Ascertain and Settle Private Land Claims in the State 
of California, the 1891 Mission Indian Relief Act, the history of Miseño 
children attending the Sherman Indian Boarding School, and payments the 
Miseño received under the California Indians Jurisdictional Act and Indian 
Claims Commission Act. R. at 2-3. Consequently, the land acquisition was 
lawful. R. at 2. 
In 2013, Scream Out for California (“SOFC”) sued the Secretary and the 
Department asserting that the ROD was a violation of the Administrative 
Procedures Act (“APA”). R. at 3. SOFC claims there is no evidence of 
federal Indian agents exerting any jurisdiction over the Miseño. R. at 3. 
Therefore, the Miseño was not a recognized tribe or under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934. R. at 3. Furthermore, SOFC argued the land 
acquisition was an unconstitutional delegation of power to the Secretary 
because Congress failed to articulate an intelligible principle to guide the 
Secretary’s discretion. R. at 3; see 25 U.S.C. § 465. Specifically, § 465 
violates the Tenth Amendment by intruding on core principles of state 
sovereignty. R. at 3. 
II. Statement of Proceedings 
The Miseño Band intervened in the case, and both sides filed motions for 
summary judgment. R. at 3. In 2014, the District Court for the Central 
District of California ruled in the Secretary’s favor. R. at 3. In 2015, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling. R. at 3. In 2016, 
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the following: 
1) whether the Secretary erred in finding that the Miseño qualify as an 
“Indian” under § 479; and 2) if § 465 is an unconstitutional use of 
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legislative authority that violates the nondelegation doctrine or the Tenth 
Amendment. R. at 3-4. 
Argument 
I. The Miseño were not a recognized Indian tribe nor under federal 
recognition in 1934, thus the Secretary of Interior’s ROD was arbitrary and 
capricious and otherwise contrary to law. 
Supreme Court precedent demands that lands cannot be taken into trust 
for tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The Secretary’s 
ROD should not receive deference because Congress spoke unambiguously 
in 25 U.S.C. § 479 that a tribe must have been recognized and under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934. Further, even if the ROD receives deference, the 
Secretary’s interpretation of § 479 is unreasonable because Congress spoke 
unambiguously. Therefore, the ROD should be afforded no deference. 
Even if the ROD is entitled to deference, the Secretary was arbitrary and 
capricious in concluding that the Miseño were under federal jurisdiction in 
1934 because the record does not support the Secretary’s conclusion. 
Furthermore, the Miseño do not fall within an exception to the Carcieri rule 
because the Secretary was arbitrary and capricious in issuing an ROD 
contrary to law. 
A. Precedent dictates the Secretary cannot accept the lands into trust. 
Once the court has determined the meaning of a statute, it adheres to its 
“ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis, and [assesses] an agency's later 
interpretation of the statute against that settled law." Neal v. United States, 
516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996). “A court's prior judicial construction of a statute 
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference 
only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the 
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency 
discretion.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 
545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005).  
The Court previously held, “for purposes of § 479, ‘now under Federal 
jurisdiction’ refers to a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the time 
of the statute’s enactment.” Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382 (2009). 
Further, “§ 479 limits the Secretary’s authority to taking land into trust for 
the purpose of providing land to members of a tribe that was under federal 
jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in June 1934.” Id. at 382. In this 
case, the Miseño were not recognized until 1982. R. at 2. The Miseño were 
not under federal jurisdiction in 1934 as the Carcieri rule requires of an 
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Indian tribe in order to have land taken into trust. The facts demonstrate that 
the commissioners sent to California did not document the presence of the 
Miseño. Further, the Miseño were not part of any treaties or negotiations 
with the federal government. The record further shows that the U.S. had 
little-to-no contact with the Miseño until well after 1934. This demonstrates 
that the U.S. does not hold the Miseño out to be under federal jurisdiction 
since they did not note any relationship with them. The law is well settled 
that tribes need to be recognized and under federal jurisdiction by 1934; the 
Secretary therefore cannot accept land into trust for the Band because of the 
Carcieri holding, since the Miseño do not fit the criteria. 
B. The ROD should not receive Chevron deference because Congress 
spoke unambiguously in § 479 and the Secretary’s interpretation of the 
statute is unreasonable. 
When reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers 
through its actions and decisions, a court is confronted with two questions: 
“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842 (1984). If Congress has spoken clearly on the issue, “the court as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The canon of statutory 
construction of “clear meaning” dictates that if a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, a court must apply the statute according to its terms and clear 
meaning. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Estate of Cowart 
v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992). The presumption is that 
Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it 
says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992). 
Further, the canon of construction requires “the court to give effect . . . to 
every clause and word of a statute.” Inhabitants of the Twp. of Montclair v. 
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883). If, in the first prong of the Chevron 
analysis, the court determines that Congress did not speak directly to the 
issue, “the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, 
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.” 
Chevron, 476 U.S. at 843. If the statute does not speak directly to the issue 
or if the court determines it is ambiguous, “the question for the court is 
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.” Id. 
  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss2/10
No. 2] SPECIAL FEATURE 487 
 
 
i. Congress spoke unambiguously in § 479, thus the ROD should not be 
afforded Chevron deference.  
The Secretary’s ROD should not be afforded Chevron deference because 
Congress spoke unambiguously in the The Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 (“IRA”). “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If Congress has spoken clearly on the 
issue, “the court as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-
43. Thus, to give effect to Congress’s intent, the agency and the Court must 
do exactly what Congress instructs.  
In the present case, Congress spoke unambiguously in the IRA that the 
Secretary is authorized to accept land into trust for “the purpose of 
providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 465. For the purposes of that 
Act, “. . . ‘Indian’ . . . shall include all persons of Indian descent who are 
members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” 25 
U.S.C. § 479. “[F]or purposes of § 479, ‘now under Federal jurisdiction’ 
refers to a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the time of the 
statute’s enactment.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379, 382. Further, “§ 479 limits the 
Secretary’s authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of providing 
land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction when the IRA 
was enacted in June 1934.” Id. at 382. As Carcieri makes clear, it is settled 
law that “now” in the IRA strictly refers to tribes that were “under federal 
jurisdiction” in 1934. 25 U.S.C. § 479. Canons of statutory construction 
inform us that a statute must be given its clear meaning and applied 
according to its terms. Estate of Cowart, 505 U.S. at 476. Consequently, 
courts must give effect to every word and provision in a statute. Inhabitants 
of the Twp. of Montclair, 107 U.S. at 152.  
Using the statute’s language, canons of construction, and case law, the 
meaning of the statute is unambiguous. At the time of the enactment of the 
IRA, “now” meant “at the present time; at this moment; at the time of 
speaking.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 388 (quoting Webster’s New International 
Dictionary 1671 (2d ed. 1934)). There is little doubt that “now under 
Federal jurisdiction” means that a tribe must be under federal jurisdiction in 
1934. 25 U.S.C. § 479. The preceding “any recognized Indian tribe” 
language is equally unambiguous. 25 U.S.C. § 479. The canons of statutory 
construction require the statute to be read in its totality, giving effect to 
every word. The phrase, “ . . . all persons of Indian descent who are 
members of any recognized Indian tribe” must therefore be given effect and 
read in conjunction with “now under Federal jurisdiction” as a singular 
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clause without a break. 25 U.S.C. § 479. A natural reading of the statute 
indicates that an “Indian” is a person of Indian descent who is a member of 
any recognized tribe now under Federal jurisdiction. While “now” modifies 
and provides temporal constraints on “Federal jurisdiction,” the phrase 
qualifies “any recognized Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 479. Thus, “any 
recognized tribe” must be “now under Federal jurisdiction.” 25 U.S.C. § 
479. Therefore, the proper reading of the statute, while giving effect to all 
parts of it, unambiguously states: an Indian is a person of Indian decent who 
is a member of any recognized tribe that was under federal jurisdiction in 
1934. The whole clause must be given effect and cannot be read as two 
separate clauses. 
As enacted in statute, the Secretary has the authority to take land into 
trust for recognized Indian tribes that were under federal jurisdiction in 
1934; the entire clause is inseparable and must be read together as one. The 
agency and the court must give effect to Congress’ will because they 
unambiguously spoke on the issue. Accordingly, because Congress spoke 
unambiguously in § 479, the Secretary must give effect to Congress’ will 
and take land into trust only for recognized tribes under federal jurisdiction 
in 1934. See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 382. 
ii. Because the Secretary’s interpretation of § 479 is unreasonable, the 
ROD should not be afforded Chevron deference. 
In the first prong of the Chevron analysis, if the Court determines that 
Congress did not speak directly to the issue, “the court does not simply 
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence of an administrative interpretation.” Chevron, 476 U.S. at 843. If 
the statute does not speak directly to the issue or if the court determines it is 
ambiguous, “the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. Thus, even if the 
court concludes that the statute was ambiguous, the court may determine 
that the agency interpreted the statute unreasonably and should be afforded 
no Chevron deference. 
“[F]or purposes of § 479, ‘now under Federal jurisdiction’ refers to a 
tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the time of the statute’s 
enactment.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379, 382. Further, “§ 479 limits the 
Secretary’s authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of providing 
land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction when the IRA 
was enacted in June 1934.” Id. at 382. In this case, the Secretary interpreted 
the statute as requiring him to “determine whether an Indian tribe was 
‘under Federal jurisdiction’ in 1934, the year the IRA was enacted, before 
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the Secretary can acquire land in trust for that tribe.” R. at 2. Further, the 
Secretary interpreted the statute to mean that “now . . . modifies only the 
phrase ‘under Federal jurisdiction’” and that a tribe “need only be 
‘recognized at the time of the land acquisition.” R. at 2. While the Secretary 
is correct that the Court held that “now under federal jurisdiction” meant 
that the tribe must be under federal jurisdiction in 1934, he misinterprets the 
preceding language to mean that the tribe need only be recognized before 
he may take land into trust for the tribe. As Carcieri held, “§ 479 limits the 
Secretary’s authority to tak[e] land into trust for the purpose of providing 
land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction when the IRA 
was enacted in June 1934.” 555 U.S. 379 at 382. The holding is clear that 
the IRA only grants the Secretary authority to take land into trust for tribes 
that were under federal jurisdiction in 1934; if a tribe is not under federal 
jurisdiction, the Secretary may not take land into trust. Not only does 
Carcieri provide precedential influence, it also provides a more reasonable 
interpretation of the statute than the agency’s current interpretation. 
In this case, the Miseño were not a recognized tribe or under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934 or any time before that. The fact that the Miseño were 
not federally recognized until 1982 weighs against the tribe because 
Congress prescribed in the IRA that the secretary may only take land into 
trust for Indian tribes who are a “ . . . recognized Indian tribe now under 
Federal jurisdiction.” 25 U.S.C. § 479. Like the Narragansett in Carcieri, 
the Miseño were not federally recognized until the 1980s. Further, like the 
Narragansett, the Miseño were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 
There, the Court held that because the Narragansett were not under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934, the Secretary lacked the authority to take land into 
trust. The facts in Carcieri are quite similar to the facts here. While the tribe 
may have had some contacts with the State, the tribe had little to no formal 
contact with the federal government. There, the Court held that the 
Secretary could not take land into trust because the tribe was not under 
federal jurisdiction in 1934. Accordingly, given the Court’s previous 
interpretation along with canons of statutory construction, the Secretary’s 
interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. 
C. The ROD is arbitrary and capricious. 
When reviewing an agency action or decision, “the reviewing court 
shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A). Additionally, 
a court may hold an agency action “unlawful and set aside agency action, 
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findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unwarranted by the facts to the 
extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.” 5 
U.S.C. § 706 (2)(F). If Congress has left any ambiguity in a statute, 
Congress delegates to the agency the authority to give the statute a 
reasonable interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S at 843-44. “Such legislative 
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S at 844. 
i. Arbitrary and capricious is the appropriate standard of review 
because the agency engaged in fact finding. 
Formal adjudication is, “adjudication required by statute to be 
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, except to 
the extent that there is involved . . . hearing and decision on notice and in 
accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title.” 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1966). 
An agency’s interpretation and implementation of a statute is afforded 
Chevron deference when, “Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). Such 
delegations can be demonstrated “by an agency's power to engage in 
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other 
indication of a comparable congressional intent.” Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 
227. Thus, only formal adjudications are afforded Chevron deference. To 
determine whether the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious, the 
court must look into “whether the decision was based on a consideration of 
the relevant factors and whether there had been a clear error of judgment.” 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
In this case, the agency engaged in informal, adjudicative fact finding. 
Following the holding of Mead, an agency is afforded Chevron deference 
only when it engages in rulemaking and formal adjudication. The informal 
adjudication here should not receive Chevron deference and should be 
subjected to arbitrary and capricious review. While the agency does have 
the power to engage in formal adjudication or rulemaking, in the present 
case, the agency used its authority to engage in informal adjudication in 
determining the eligibility of the Miseño’s land. This is evidenced by the 
fact that the statute enabling the Secretary to take land into trust for tribes 
does not provide for the requirements of 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and 557. 
The process of taking land into trust is informal adjudication because the 
statute does not provide for the requirements of § 554. Accordingly, 
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Chevron deference is not appropriate and only arbitrary and capricious 
review should be afforded. 
ii. Even if the Secretary’s decision is entitled to Chevron deference, the 
decision is arbitrary and capricious. 
To determine whether the agency’s decision was arbitrary and 
capricious, the court must look into “whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there had been a clear 
error of judgment.” Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402, 416. As long as a 
regulation exists, it has the force of law. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 695 (1974). Thus, an agency is required to follow its regulations 
because they have the same force of law as a statute. “There is, then, at least 
a presumption that [congressional policy and agency regulation] will be 
carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to. From this presumption 
flows the agency's duty to explain its departure from prior norms.” 
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.  Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973). 
The court must look into “whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there had been a clear 
error of judgment.” Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
When taking land into trust for a tribe, the Secretary must consider:  
(a) The existence of statutory authority for the acquisition and 
any limitations contained in such authority; (b) The need of the 
individual Indian or the tribe for additional land; (c) The 
purposes for which the land will be used; . . . (e) If the land to be 
acquired is in unrestricted fee status, the impact on the State and 
its political subdivisions resulting from the removal of the land 
from the tax rolls; (f) Jurisdictional problems and potential 
conflicts of land use which may arise; and (g) If the land to be 
acquired is in fee status, whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs is 
equipped to discharge the additional responsibilities resulting 
from the acquisition of the land in trust status. 
25 C.F.R. § 151.11 (1980). In this case, the Secretary failed to follow the 
agency regulations and did not consider all relevant factors. First, he failed 
to fully consider existing statutory authority because the Miseño did not 
qualify for land to be taken into trust. Further, the ROD does not 
demonstrate that the Secretary fully considered the purpose for which the 
land will be used, the impact to the State of California, jurisdictional 
problems, and whether the BIA is equipped to take on the responsibility of 
the new land acquisition. The ROD is arbitrary and capricious because the 
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Secretary deviated from the agency’s regulations to which he is bound and 
did not consider all relevant factors in the record.  
Additionally, the Secretary made a clear error in judgment. The Miseño, 
as a tribe, were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The fact that the 
federally appointed Indian agent for California and the sub-agent for Indian 
Affairs for Southern California never mentioned the Miseño in their reports 
or documents weighs heavily against the argument that the Miseño were 
under federal jurisdiction at that time. R. at 1. Further, the Miseño’s village 
was located outside of the land reserved under the 1852 Treaty of 
Temecula. R. at 1. No Miseño leader took part in the negotiation of, or was 
a signatory to, any of the nineteen treaties between the federal government 
and the California Indian people. R. at 1. These facts strongly indicate that 
the Miseño had little-to-no contact with the federal government. 
Accordingly, the Miseño were neither recognized nor under federal 
jurisdiction on or before 1934. Thus, the Secretary’s conclusion is arbitrary 
and capricious.  
In arriving at the conclusion that the Miseño were under federal 
jurisdiction, the Secretary provides the following facts as support: (1) the 
Miseño fit within categories of the 1851 Act to Ascertain and Settle Private 
Lands Claims; (2) the Miseño qualified under the 1891 Mission Indian 
Relief Act; (3) several Miseño children attended the Sherman Indian 
Boarding School in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s; and (4) the Miseño 
received payments made to California Indians in 1944 and 1974 under the 
California Indians Jurisdictional Act and Indians Claims Commission Act, 
respectively. None of these facts are sufficient to support a conclusion that 
the Miseño were under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 
The 1851 Act to Ascertain and Settle Private Lands Claims in the State 
of California provides that “it shall be the duty of the commissioners . . . to 
ascertain and report . . . the tenure by which the mission lands are held . . . 
and also those which are occupied and cultivated by Pueblos or Rancheros 
Indians.” 9 Stat. 631-34 at 634 (1851). If this section applied to the Miseño, 
it would provide strong support for finding the Miseño under federal 
jurisdiction. However, the facts are clear that the commissioners appointed 
to California never mentioned the Miseño in their documents or reports. 
Further, in the 1891 Mission Indian Relief Act, Congress appointed 
commissioners “to arrange a just and satisfactory settlement of the Mission 
Indians residing in the State of California” and authorized the 
commissioners “to select a reservation for each band or village of the 
Mission Indians.” 26 Stat. 712, 712 (1891). Again, the facts indicate that 
the commissioners appointed by the Secretary never documented or 
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reported any contact with the Miseño. If these federal acts never mentioned 
the Miseño, then the tribe cannot argue that they were under federal 
jurisdiction at the time. 
The Secretary also points to the 1891 Mission Indians Relief Act as a 
basis for his conclusion, but the Act does support a conclusion that the 
Miseño were recognized or under federal jurisdiction. The Act authorizes 
the commissioner “to arrange a just and satisfactory settlement of the 
Mission Indians residing in [California], . . . to select a reservation for each 
band or village of the Mission Indians . . . [;]” to set aside allotments for the 
Bands of Indians; and to defend any claims to Mexican land grants for the 
Indians.” 26 Stat. 712, 712-14 (1891). While the Secretary points to this Act 
as a basis for his conclusion, the facts demonstrate that the commissioners 
appointed to Southern California never documented any contact with the 
Miseño. Further, the facts show that the federal government did not 
recognize the Miseño until 1982. The fact that the Secretary points to an 
Act to support his conclusion from which the Miseño never benefitted 
indicates an arbitrary and capricious action. 
The Secretary proceeds to cite the finding that several Miseño children 
attended the Sherman Indian Boarding School in the 1920s, 1930s, and 
1940s. While the children did attend school prior to 1934, this fact alone is 
not determinative of federal jurisdiction over the Miseño. For example, it is 
possible that the children might have been believed to be from a different 
tribe given the federal government’s relationship with the “Mission 
Indians” in the region. Id. The record does not support the conclusion that 
Miseño children attended the school because the Miseño were under federal 
jurisdiction.  
The Secretary cites the fact that the Miseño received payments in 1944 
and 1974 under the California Indians Jurisdictional Act and Indians Claims 
Commission Act, respectively. The California Indians Jurisdictional Act 
provides that “for the purposes of this Act the Indians of California shall be 
defined to be all Indians who were residing in the State of California on 
June 1, 1852[,] and their descendants now living in said State.” 45 Stat. 602 
(1928). While it may be argued that the payments under this Act 
demonstrate that the Miseño were either federally recognized or under 
federal jurisdiction, mere payment under the act does not constitute federal 
recognition or the status of being under federal jurisdiction. First, the 
language expressly limits the definition of Indians for the purposes of this 
Act; conversely, 25 U.S.C. § 479 provides the adequate definition for the 
present purpose of taking land into trust. Second, the payments under the 
Act were not made until well after 1934, the date required for federal 
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jurisdiction provided in § 479. Third, the fact remains that the 
commissioners never documented any contact with the Miseño which 
would support the conclusion that the Miseño were either recognized, or 
under federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the payments made under California 
Indians Jurisdictional Act do not demonstrate that the Miseño were under 
federal jurisdiction in 1934. 
The Indian Claims Commission Act creates a commission to hear and 
adjudicate claims made by Indians against the United States. 60 Stat. 1049, 
1049-56 (1946). The Secretary cited payments made under this Act to 
support the conclusion that the Miseño were under federal jurisdiction. 
However, the Act does not include a definition of “Indian” and only 
authorizes claims until 1946. Thus, the payments made to the Miseño may 
have been for claims between 1934 and 1946. The Record is not clear about 
claims for which those payments were made, but does clearly indicate that 
there was little-to-no contact between the federal government and the 
Miseño until the payments were made. Further, the payments were made 
well after 1934. Accordingly, the Secretary’s reliance on these facts to 
support his conclusion is arbitrary and capricious.   
Finally, the ROD is arbitrary and capricious because the agency departed 
from its own previous interpretation of the statute. Whenever an agency 
departs from its prior interpretation of a statute, it must provide a reason for 
doing so. Atchison, 412 U.S. 800. In 1936, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
John Collier, interpreted the term “Indian” in the IRA to mean, “all persons 
of Indian decent who are members of any recognized tribe that was under 
Federal jurisdiction at the date of the Act.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379, 380 
(quoting Letter from John Collier, Commissioner, to Superintendents (Mar. 
7, 1936). The Court in Carcieri did not defer to this interpretation, but did 
recognize that the Commissioner had interpreted the statute in that manner. 
The Secretary’s new interpretation of the statute is at odds with prior 
interpretations of the statute. The Secretary did not justify a change in 
definition. Furthermore, the canons of statutory construction instruct an 
agency and court to give effect to all parts of a statute. Accordingly, the 
entire clause must be read together and given its full meaning. Because the 
Secretary does not provide a justifiable basis for departing from its prior 
interpretation, the agency’s new interpretation in the ROD is arbitrary and 
capricious. 
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D. The Miseño’s trust land does not fall within an exception to the 
Carcieri rule. 
The baseline rule is that for purposes of § 479, ‘now under Federal 
jurisdiction’ refers to a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the time 
of the statute’s enactment.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 382. Further, “§ 479 limits 
the Secretary’s authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of 
providing land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction 
when the IRA was enacted in June 1934.” Id. at 382. Lower courts have 
held that the Secretary may take land into trust for tribes so long as the 
recognition happens before the land is taken into trust. See Confederated 
Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. of Oregon v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016). 
While the Court in Grand Ronde held that the Secretary could take land 
into trust for tribes so long as the tribe was recognized before the land was 
taken into trust, it relied on the fact that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
of 1988 (“IGRA”) authorizes the Secretary to take land into trust in certain 
situations. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b). For instance, the Secretary may take land 
into trust for gaming purposes if the land is part of “the initial reservation of 
an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(ii). The Secretary may also take 
land into trust if the land has been acquired as part of “the restoration of 
lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal recognition.” 25 U.S.C. § 
2719(b)(1)(B)(iii); see City of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 
2003). Before taking land into trust for gaming purposes, the Secretary 
must consult with the Governor of the state in concluding that gaming 
would be beneficial to the tribe and non-detrimental to the surrounding 
community. 25 C.F.R. § 151.11. Thus, an exception to Carcieri exists for 
tribes to take land into trust: the land must have been initially requested into 
trust for gaming purposes under IGRA. 
In this case, the facts clearly show that the land had not been 
contemplated as an IGRA acquisition. In order to fall within an exception 
listed in § 2719, the Secretary should have undertaken the process of 
consulting with the Governor; and because the process never occurred, the 
land does not fall within an exception to Carcieri. Accordingly, the 
Secretary has no authority to take the land into trust because the tribe was 
not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 
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II. Section 5 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 465, is an unconstitutional exercise of 
Congressional authority barred by the nondelegation doctrine and the 
Tenth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court should reach the merits of the case because Congress 
has granted the Secretary a power that does not conform to an intelligible 
principle, and therefore violates the nondelegation doctrine. When Congress 
confers a legislative power to an executive agency, they must adequately 
define who gets to exercise the power, the purpose behind it, and limit the 
extent of its use. Am. Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). 
Congress plainly failed to meet two of these standards in drafting § 465. As 
a result, the Secretary has been given an unchecked power to take any land 
into trust on the behalf of Indians, which is an improper delegation of 
legislative power. 
Additionally, the authority of the Secretary to place state land into trust 
is not written in the Constitution and supersedes the rights of the state of 
California. While the Indian Commerce Clause has historically granted a 
wide berth for Congress to manage Indian affairs, it does not mention the 
land into trust process. The Tenth Amendment specifically reserves those 
rights to the states if they have not been delegated to the federal 
government. U.S. Const. amend. X. As a result, courts have been willing to 
limit the Indian Commerce Clause when it interferes with state land or 
rights. The Secretary’s action of placing state land into trust without 
California’s consent erodes state sovereignty, and runs up against the 
threshold of the Tenth Amendment, federalism, and the equal footing 
doctrine. 
A. 25 U.S.C. § 465 is an unconstitutional delegation of authority because 
it fails to provide an adequate intelligible principle for the Secretary. 
The Constitution states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. Const., art. 1, § 1. 
Congress violates the nondelegation doctrine when it “delegate[s] its 
legislative power to another branch of Government.” Touby v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991). However, “[i]f Congress shall lay down 
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body. . . is 
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of 
legislative power.” J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States., 276 U.S. 
394, 409 (1928). The point where Congress has created an intelligible 
principle has not been precisely defined; however, the Court should 
consider “if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public 
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.” 
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Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989) (quoting Am. 
Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 105). Statutes have been struck down for 
the legislature’s failure to properly define the agency’s authority in Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); or for overreliance on an 
ambiguous term like “fair competition” in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States., 295 U.S. 495, 531 (1935). The prevailing application of 
the nondelegation doctrine has been decidedly liberal since these older 
cases. Nevertheless, the Court has reaffirmed the application of the 
nondelegation doctrine in a modern context. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., 
Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
When the legislature delegates power to an agency, they must define the 
extent of its reach, and failure to do so risks an unconstitutional delegation. 
§ 465 provides improperly delegated legislative power because the act 
does not sufficiently limit the Secretary’s discretion with an intelligible 
principle. The act authorizes the Secretary to take on and off-reservation 
land into trust for Indians. Under the Mistretta factors, the act only satisfies 
the identification prong since the power is clearly assigned to the Secretary. 
Congress does not delineate the policy behind the action or the boundaries 
of the Secretary’s delegated authority in § 465. The closest the act comes to 
providing general policy behind the delegation is that the Secretary may 
acquire land “for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 
465. At best, this logic is circular. A policy should do more than restate the 
action that the agency has been permitted to take through legislative 
delegation. Other courts have claimed the general policy of the land into 
trust process is plain by citing the legislative history preceding the IRA. See 
South Dakota v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(The court referred to comments made by Senator Wheeler). The policy 
behind the act should be apparent, rather than hidden in the legislative 
history. Congress is expected to provide a clear intelligible principle 
through “legislative act,” rather than the bill’s history. J.W. Hampton Jr., & 
Co., 276 U.S. at 409. On its face, the § 465 language does not frame the 
policy behind the land into trust process. A party primarily relying on 
legislative history to demonstrate the policy of an act is standing on shaking 
ground. After all, “Congress . . . does not, one might say, hide elephants in 
mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
Furthermore, the act barely provides any stipulations on the Secretary’s 
ability to take land into trust. The Secretary has the discretion “to 
acquire . . . any interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands, 
within or without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise 
restricted allotments, whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the 
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purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 465. This language 
grants unfettered discretion to the Secretary to take any land they see fit 
into trust. Any land can be taken into trust if done to provide “land for 
Indians.” Id. Under such broad authority, any land acquisition is defensible. 
Consequently, Justices of the Court have been willing to consider whether 
the Secretary’s authority to place lands into trust is an unconstitutional 
delegation of power. Dept. of Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919, 920 
(1996) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). When the Eighth Circuit held § 465 an 
invalid delegation of power under the nondelegation doctrine in South 
Dakota v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 885 (8th Cir. 1995), the 
Department responded with a regulation on the land into process. Dept. of 
Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. at 920. The Department recognized that 
their delegated power had not been adequately narrowed. 25 C.F.R. § 
151.12 requires the Secretary publish any decision to take land into trust, 
and permits any party to seek judicial review of the decision. Nevertheless, 
this action should not override the fact that Congress has the duty to define 
the boundaries of an agency’s delegated power. The Court has “never 
suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of legislative 
power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute.” 
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472. In assessing the validity of a nondelegation 
claim, the Court should examine the act in isolation from subsequent non-
legislative changes. In fact, the Department’s self-imposed regulation 
demonstrates the lackluster job Congress did defining the limits on the 
Secretary’s discretion. Congress has the sole duty to draft an effective 
intelligible principle. Therefore, the Department’s relatively recent 
regulation cannot save § 465 from a nondelegation challenge. 
B. 25 U.S.C. § 465 violates the Tenth Amendment because the right to 
put land into trust is not explicitly granted in the Indian Commerce 
Clause and is an overreach of Federal power into the state’s 
sovereignty.  
The Indian Commerce Clause has been interpreted by the Court to grant 
Congress “plenary power to legislate . . . Indian affairs.” Cotton Petroleum 
Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). Still, the power of the 
Indian Commerce Clause is not absolute in the face of state’s rights. See 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (holding that 
Congress’s complete authority over Indian affairs does not preempt state 
sovereign immunity). § 465 is an example of Congress exceeding its 
constitutional grant. The Constitution reserves all powers not delegated to 
the United States to the individual states. U.S. Const. amend. X. It does not 
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delegate Congress the right to put land into trust without permission from 
the state where the land is located. The concept that the Secretary can 
acquire land and put it into trust, thereby transferring land from state to 
tribal and federal jurisdiction, is contrary to federalism, the Tenth 
Amendment, and the equal footing doctrine.  
The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people.” Id. A natural reading of the 
amendment demands that any limitation on state’s rights should be clearly 
stated. Ambiguity should be interpreted in favor of the states and their 
citizens because any power not delegated to the federal government is 
reserved to the states. While the Indian Commerce Clause has been 
interpreted to give all-encompassing authority over Indian affairs to the 
federal government, courts have been careful about justifying wide-
reaching discretion when it conflicts with the integrity of state territory. The 
Court has said, “Congress cannot, after statehood, reserve or convey 
submerged lands that ‘ha[ve] already been bestowed’ upon a State.” Idaho 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 280 n.9 (2001). The Court took this notion 
beyond submerged territory when it suggested that Congress would “raise 
grave constitutional concerns if it purported to ‘cloud’ Hawaii's title to its 
sovereign lands more than three decades after the State's admission to the 
Union.” Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 176 (2009). 
The Secretary’s authority to take land into trust undermines a state’s 
internal jurisdiction because it allows state sovereign territory to be 
transferred beyond their jurisdiction without their permission. 
A California court ejected the Miseño from their remaining land title in 
1881. R. at 1. Thus, California has had authority over their territory since 
statehood. If California had the right to quiet the Miseño’s title, it is 
inconsistent to allow the Secretary to restore their territory rather than the 
state. California may restore the Miseño’s title or other land should they 
want; however, § 465 permits the Secretary to overreach and act 
unilaterally, thereby depriving California of a right they had when the 
Miseño were ejected. The Secretary has a policy to restore tribal lands 
throughout the country, and it is by no means inconsistent with federalism 
or the Tenth Amendment, but the current approach is improper. The 
Secretary should facilitate a working relationship between the Miseño and 
California, rather than restore the Miseño’s land base more than a century 
after they had last had any title. 
A narrower version of this argument is found in the history between the 
federal government and the Miseño, or lack thereof. The Indian Affairs 
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agents for California did not mention the Miseño in any reports, nor the 
Miseño participate in any treaty between California Indian tribes or the 
federal government. R. at 1. Until the recognition of the Miseño in 1982, 
the tribe and the United States did not have a relationship, but they did with 
California. R. at 2. The Miseño were removed from their last village in 
1881 by the state, and continued to live under state jurisdiction for the next 
century until they gained federal recognition. R. at 1-2. Tribal citizens of a 
federally recognized tribe have many rights that do not infringe on a state’s 
rights, like health care provisions and political status, but those that affect 
state jurisdiction may conflict with federalism and the Tenth Amendment. 
In this instance, where the tribe interacted with the state instead of the 
federal government since statehood, the risk of infringing on California is 
even greater. Consequently, the Court should limit the Secretary’s ability to 
put land into trust for newly recognized tribes because the Constitution does 
not delegate this power to Congress. This is especially the case when the 
state, rather than the federal government, has historically had jurisdiction 
over the tribe. 
Furthermore, the equal footing doctrine stands for “the constitutional 
principle that all States are admitted to the Union with the same attributes 
of sovereignty . . . as the original 13 States.” Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band 
of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 203 (1999). This argument has been 
ineffective in cases dealing with treaty rights. See id. at 208 (holding the 
equal footing doctrine does not implicitly abrogate treaty rights); 
Washington v. Buchanan, 138 Wash. 2d 186, 213 (Wash. 1999) (affirming 
the inapplicability of treaty abrogation via the equal footing doctrine). 
However, the Miseño are acquiring more than treaty rights that were never 
abrogated. The Secretary’s ROD will grant the Miseño title to land that they 
have not claimed since the nineteenth century, and a right that the state had 
extinguished. The fact that California successfully and legally removed the 
Miseño from the land demonstrates that this land had been regarded as the 
state’s they were admitted to the union. To allow the Secretary to transfer 
the land after statehood violates the equal footing doctrine by minimizing a 
key element of California’s sovereignty. Ultimately, § 465 is 
unconstitutional under federalism, the Tenth Amendment, and the equal 
footing doctrine because the federal government overextends their reach 
into what has been recognized as crucial aspects of state sovereignty. 
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Conclusion 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment made by the District Court 
for the Central District of California, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit should be reversed. The Court should prevent the 
Secretary from taking land into trust on the behalf of the Miseño. 
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